US Airways 1549 Damage Photos

These photos were taken by the crane operator during salvage of the US Airways Flight 1549 aircraft.

It’s remarkable how little damage there was to the fuselage of this Airbus A320. Obviously the aircraft will never fly again — even minor damage incidents can cost millions of dollars to repair — but I think these images are important for us to examine. They illustrate not just how skillful the pilots were during the landing, but also just how much punishment these aircraft are built to take.

Airliners are tough. They endure year after year of constant use, often 16 hours a day or more. They travail the -60 degree flight levels, then bake in 110 degree summer heat. They are pressurized and de-pressurized tens of thousands of times. They fly through punishing turbulence, endure lightning strikes, and even the occasional bird strike. Amazing, isn’t it?

The radome damage (on the nose of the aircraft) was probably a bird strike from the same flock that took out the engines. The right engine cowling is pretty mangled, but that could also have been at least partly from the birds.

In several of the photos you can even see one of the checklists, flight plans, or other crew documents still sitting on the glareshield. It’s almost as if the aircraft is saying, “hey, we’ve still got one more leg to fly, guys!”.

Legacy/Gol Accident: Ignorance Is Bliss

Selling crazy on the internet is nothing new, but for some reason it’s really getting under my skin as it regards the Legacy/Gol accident. I got into it the other day on an internet forum with someone who was sure the bizjet crew had to be at fault, yet couldn’t explain why.

Can anyone out there explain to me why the Legacy crew was under house arrest for two months? Whatever the suspected cause of the accident, the detainment was a violation of the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) 1963 Tokyo Convention, something to which every ICAO signatory subscribes.

As far as I can tell, the crux of the detainment stems from the fact that “the pilots did not stick to their flight plan”. To those who are not aviators, that probably sounds like an undeniable indicator of wrongdoing. But anyone who operates under or is knowledgeable about Instrument Flight Rules will tell you that a filed flight plan means nothing. In most places, pilots virtually never make a flight exactly as it appears on a flight plan. ATC is always giving re-routes, differerent altitudes, vectors, and doing other things to account for traffic conflicts, weather, and so on.

What matters is not what was filed, but what they were assigned in their clearance. And they were assigned the same altitude as the Gol 737. ATC instructed both planes to maintain same altitude and they complied with that clearance as required by regulations. Neither one knew that the other aircraft was at the same altitude. The only party with that information is air traffic control. They have the radar screens, the flight data strips, the “big picture”. They are the ones that issue routes to fly and altitudes to maintain, and therefore it seems to me that Brazilian ATC is the most likely culprit here.

Wherever you go on this planet, ATC’s primary job is to separate IFR traffic from other IFR traffic. Regulations require pilots to maintain a visual scan for other airplanes when flying in visual conditions, regardless of the flight rules under which they are operating. However, if one seeks to place blame on the Legacy crew for failure to see-and-avoid, then an equal share must fall on the Boeing’s flight crew.

Regulations aside, the see-and-avoid argument is a tough one to comply with in a place where airplanes can converge at up to 1,200 mph. That’s one mile every three seconds. This is one of the reasons airliners and business jets have Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems. TCAS systems not only alert the crew to traffic conflicts, but will actually communicate with TCAS systems in other aircraft and coordinate collision avoidance. This is known as a “resolution advisory”. One airplane’s TCAS will command the flight crew to climb, and the other aircraft’s crew will be ordered to descend.

As far as I know, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Legacy’s transponder was physically turned off by the pilots, or that the crew was doing anything improper or unusual. Mainstream media has reporting that the Legacy crew performed aerobatics, intentionally disabled their transponder, and refused to acknowledge ATC transmissions, but each of those claims later turned out to be unsubstantiated.

The one question mark is why the TCAS systems didn’t alert the flight crews to the impending conflict. The Legacy was brand new, having just rolled out of the factory shortly before the flight. Is it possible there was an avionics problem? An antenna issue? A blown circuit breaker or other fault? It’s possible. But whatever the cause, it seems likely that Brazil’s air traffic control system contributed mightily to this accident, something Brazil has been loathe to admit.

If you want to read an account of Brazilian air traffic control from someone who’s been there, here’s what a 38,000 hour pilot and former 747 captain had to say about flying in that neck of the woods:

I am not even slightly surprised that two aircraft collided while under “control” of Brazilian ATC, but I am very surprised we don’t see more such mid-airs. I flew in Central and South America, including Brazil, in the late ’50s, mostly cargo and ferry flights. In 1994, while working for JAL, I began flying three trips a month between Los Angeles and Sao Paulo until my “first retirement” in 2001. Not much had changed in the intervening four decades.

Communications are still horrible to non-existent. HF is still being used routinely, even when VHF is available. It is somewhat anachronistic to be flying near enough to Porto Velho to see the lights of the city, and still have to talk to them on HF. Call them on the VHF frequency and they may answer, but they will often ask to switch to HF for the position report, or for the next call. There is no question they prefer using HF, but I still don’t understand why. As far as I know, all ATC services are provided by the military, and by rather low-paid and poorly trained personnel. The results of that are inevitable, and many times I’ve flown through an ATC sector without being able to raise anyone, HF or VHF. If someone does respond, it is sometimes obvious they’ve just awakened. There are several sectors (Porto Velho being one) where any transmission from the ground is overwhelmed by loud music in the same room as the mike, and it sounds like the controller is across the room, yelling in the general direction of the mike. Party time, I guess, or maybe just trying to stay awake.

Even when the radio works, all communications are in Portuguese, unless no one on the aircraft can speak it. Then English will be used, but it’s very hard to understand. Of course, any transmission in English that is not absolutely standard and very common will not be understood on the ground at all, leading to “Say again?” or, worse, they will ignore further calls of any kind. The vast majority of flights over Brazil are flown by crews who do not speak either Portuguese or English as a native language, so it is the Tower of Babel all over again. It is dangerous, but heck, the same thing happens in France, Quebec, Russia and many other countries, too. We are very fortunate in the good-old United States, where we can push a button and talk to someone in English. Most of the time, anyway.

There is essentially no radar coverage in South America, except around large cities. Where there is radar, they don’t use it en route, because aircraft will soon be out of coverage again, so they are forced to fall back on timed separation at all times, and the old-fashion position reports (which most American pilots have never done). To be fair, arrivals and departures are sometimes vectored in the terminal area at low altitude.

In seven years of my operating on that route, there were five incidents where other aircraft were definitely in “my airspace” by any standards. This is made worse by those countries who consider a national airline a matter of pride, and whose crews take short-cuts. In one of those, I watched a Lan Chile aircraft cross our track a mile or two ahead, at our altitude, close enough to identify the logo at night. Both Lan Chile and ATC denied it, for the aircraft was supposed to be crossing at a VOR about 60 miles behind us. They were giving phony position reports (in Spanish), and simply taking a big shortcut. I felt it prudent to climb a few hundred feet to avoid a huge bump from the wake. File a report, and it would never see the light of day. I did anyway, and never heard a thing.

In my opinion, it would be much safer to do away with ATC entirely in areas like this. In trying to “control” aircraft with the equipment they have, and the “skill” they demonstrate, they create danger. I’d feel much more comfortable going with random routes and altitudes and using TCAS for my own separation.

“Over The Airwaves” and the GA Fatal Accident Rate

Many of us in the aviation world have recently come to know the name Robert Miller.  Mr. Miller is an east coast CFI and the author of Over the Airwaves.  OTA’s masthead describes it as ”the bi-weekly journal for the proficient pilot”.

I’ve been reading Over the Airwaves for about a year and find that I agree with Mr. Miller on many points.  He’s obviously dedicated to the issue of flight safety and a proponent of realistic, recurrent training which exceeds the Practical Test Standards and embraces the real-world aspects of flying.

I continue to read OTA and learn a lot from it.  And I should note that his dedication to publishing Over the Airwaves is admirable.  One can’t help but stand in awe of the many hours it must take to put together each issue.  I commend him for venturing beyond the traditional CFI methods of providing information to pilots and hope he continues to publish OTA for a long time.

Having said that, I’ve noticed that OTA seems to spawn from a single raison d’etre, namely that the general aviation fatal accident rate is “worsening at an alarming rate” (OTA Vol. 3, No. 25).  Statistics, tables, and charts are proffered in support of this thesis, and I must admit the case looks compelling.  It begs the question:  have AOPA, the Air Safety Foundation, the FAA, and the NTSB been lying to us?  Are they glossing over the true story on general aviation flight safety?

I decided to look into this issue a little deeper, not to discredit Mr. Miller or his publication — remember, I’m an avid reader of Over the Airwaves - but because for some reason his theory just didn’t feel right.

I began by asking him where he got the raw data to support the claim that “We are marching down seven straight years of worsening GA fatal accident rates”, because the data I see from the Air Safety Foundation and NTSB suggest that the fatal accident rate has been in a long term hold.  In light of the fact that annual GA flight hours are estimated, the NTSB figures showing a rate hovering near 1.3 per 100,000 hours for the past decade indicate that GA fataility rates are not getting worse.  My source:  http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table10.htm

Bob very kindly replied and referred me to the headline article in Volume 3, Issue 23a of OTA.  This article uses avgas sales to suggest declining flying activity.  He also pointed me to a linear regression analysis at the bottom of Volume 3, Issue 25 which suggests an increasing fatal accident rate:

After reviewing the data, I still suggest that his analysis is quite flawed.  Miller ties avgas burned to hours flown.  To be fair, the NTSB uses the same methodology.  However, the connection between the two cannot be a direct one, because the Department of Energy stats he references would then indicate that flying activity has declined 80% since 1983.  The table shows a drop from 418,000 gallons/day in 1983 to 98,000 gallons/day in 2004.

A more logical explanation is that there are various reasons for the drop in avgas fuel usage:

  • Let’s begin with the pilot popuation.  Yes, there are fewer pilots flying today than there were in the 1980s.  I don’t really care how many are in the FAA registry.  Many of them don’t fly anyway, just as they didn’t fly in the 80s.  But the number of active pilots is down, maybe 10% I’d estimate.  Even if it’s higher, there’s no way it would come close to an 80% drop.

 

  • There are fewer piston twins flying today than there were in 1983.  Who is even making piston twins these days?  The Baron, Seminole, and TwinStar sales combined total fewer than 50 airplanes per year.  Cessna is completely out of the piston twin market, and for the most part so is Piper.  No more 300 and 400 series twins, no more Twin Comanches, Apaches, Aztecs, Twin Bonanzas.  You name a piston twin, it’s pretty much been out of production for decades.  And the existing piston twin fleet is being decimated by the inevitable ravages of time, spar ADs, high operating costs, limited parts supplies, and so on.  Fewer twins flying = lower total fuel consumption per hour flown.

 

  • Single engine airplanes are more efficient.  An SR20, SR22, DA20, DA40, Columbia, or other modern airplane gets far better economy than the airplanes of the 80s.  Composite construction and advanced aerodynamics allow these planes to fly with less drag.  Any decent MFD or GPS can show you the real time NMPG efficiency of that airplane.  Especially at lean of peak operation, these planes burn a fraction of the fuel a piston twin does.

 

  • Now, consider lean-of-peak operation.  Advanced engine monitoring and fuel metering for GA has led to greater use of fuel efficient operating techniques.  We care about fuel burn now because fuel is expensive.  Even without an engine monitor, nobody goes flying around with the red knob all the way in for hours on end.  In my Pitts, I can burn anywhere between 11 and 26 gph.  Considering that I only have 23 gallons of fuel on board when I takeoff, that’s not irrelevant data.

 

  • But the biggest factor in the decline of avgas since the early 80s is the nearly 100% decline in piston twin usage by commercial operators since 1983.  The commercial operators used to fly piston airliners for freight delivery, and GA piston twins for smaller stuff.  Corporate operators used to fly executives around in piston twins, whereas nowadays nearly all those folks have moved up to turbine twins and/or jets.  The corporate/commercial operators flew a huge chunk of the total piston hours in the early 80s.  Over time, they moved to turbine equipment and therefore bought less and less avgas.

 

  • Look at the DOE statistics for jet fuel usage.  They show a 65% increase in jet fuel consumption over the same period that avgas dropped by 80%. During that same period, the total U.S. civil fleet has remained consistent in numbers, ~200,000 aircraft on the registry.

OTA’s fatal accident rate per million gallons of avgas consumed analysis is also flawed, because the GA accident rate includes all sorts of general aviation airplanes, and as previously noted, a great portion of GA flight hours are now being accumulated in aircraft with turbine rather than piston engines.

In regards to Mr. Miller’s linear regression table at http://overtheairwaves.com/vol3-215.gif, it is also deceptive.  It uses too few data points to be statistically relevant.  Increase the data to include numbers going back to 1983, as he did with avgas, and it would show a different picture, namely a) a long term decline in accident rates, and b) that the chart’s vertical axis only represents 0.14/100,000.  Zoom in far enough and you can make anything look bad just by virtue of the chart’s scale.

Even given the data as Mr. Miller presents it, there exists a variance between a fatal accident rate of 1.25 and 1.32 per 100,000 hours flown.  Think about that.  For every 100,000 hours flown, the accident rate went from 1.25 to 1.32.  That’s an increase of 0.07 accidents per 100,000 hours.  To put it another way, it’s an increase of 5%, which to be honest is probably less than the margin of error when you consider that the hours flown are merely an estimate.

OTA describes this as “worsening at an alarming rate”.  Am I crazy for disagreeing?

As I said before, my analysis is not designed to slight Mr. Miller or his publication.  I simply suggest that he is trying to have it both ways with the statistics.  He claims that the NTSB’s “hours flown” esimates are way off because of the decline in avgas usage, yet uses those same NTSB numbers for his regression analysis.

These are just one guy’s thoughts on the matter.  But from where I sit, the accident rate is holding steady over the past few years, and remains in a long term decline.




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